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Abstract 
Using a panel dataset of 86 countries from 1960-2005, this paper empirically assesses the effect of several democracy 
proxies (by means of the Polity IV database), together with a set of control variables, such as human capital and the 
initial level of GDP per capita, on the rate of economic growth. By means of pooled OLS regressions, fixed effects 
and TSLS estimation procedures our results support the long-run conditional convergence hypothesis and they show a 
positive and statistically significant effect of democracy and human capital on economic growth. Furthermore, these 
findings are robust to several sensitivity exercises, such as the consideration of different time spans and groupings (rich 
and poor countries). Our evaluation allows us to conclude that electoral democracy, by itself, increases GDP growth 
per capita while almost no support is found for the hypothesis that autocracy, by itself, increases it.
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     1 Introduction
There has been a longstanding curiosity among economists, to determine the linkages
between democracy and economic growth. Unfortunately, given the lack of a proper theo-
retical framework, existing empirical ￿ndings have been contradictory to a large extent. Our
contribution rests on the use of the recent Polity IV Project database together with a large
time span of 45 years to a sample of 86 developed and developing countries.
Since the early 1990￿ s economic growth theory, in addition to recognize the importance
of the initial income level, the role of education and the rates of marginal return to capital
to explain growth, has been asking whether the political regime also plays a signi￿cant part
on a country￿ s economic performance. That is, does democracy foster or hinder growth and
social welfare?
One of the earliest papers addressing the relationships between political regime and eco-
nomic growth was explored by Lipset (1959). At this stage one can distinguish two di⁄erent
groups: one favouring the hypothesis that democracy hinders economic growth; and a sec-
ond one claiming the opposite result. The fear that democracy may undermine the economic
growth was ￿rst presented by Schweinitz (1959) and a similar argument was made by Hunt-
ington and Domiguez (1975) and Rao (1984). The latter group of authors argued that with
democracy the interest of general voter always lies towards the party supporting immediate
consumption rather than future investments. Early empirical evidence include the works by
Marsh (1979) and Weede (1983).
On the other hand, more recently, the thesis supporting that democracy actually fosters
growth was initially delivered by Scully (1988), Barro (1989) and Helliwell (1994). Never-
theless, as shown by Przeworski and Limongi (1993) out of nineteen empirical studies of
economic growth and democracy, only nine studies found evidence for a faster growth of
democracies against dictatorships. So, the controversy remained. Nevertheless they also
provided the reasons behind the above mentioned empirical disparity (together with Sirowy
and Inkeles, 1990): ￿rstly, di⁄erent studies look at a wide range of countries and a variety
of time periods, and most studies focus on a time span of ten to twenty ￿ve years. Sec-
ondly, there are no such well de￿ned base-economic models that actually capture the e⁄ect
of democracy on growth. Lastly, there is also the issue causality involved (Heo and Tan,
2001).
Our results suggest that democracy (particularly when considering an extreme-type
regime) has a marginally positive impact on economic growth (even when taking into account
the role of human capital/education); nevertheless, this statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect fades
away as more controls, such as investment or openness, are included in the regression and
endogeneity is considered.
In addition to this introduction the paper has 4 more sections organized as follows.
In section 2 we present the data used throughout the paper together with de￿nitions and
sources, as well as a brief discussion on the methodological approach. Section 3 presents our
preliminary results based on OLS regressions. Section 4 explores the relationship at hands
under (additional) di⁄erent econometric procedures by conducting a number of robustness
exercises. The last section concludes.
12 Data sources and methodology
Our dependent variable is the growth rate of per capita GDP (RGDP) retrieved from
the Penn World Tables1. For the purpose of assessing the "convergence hypothesis", the
initial level of development proxied by per capita GDP in 1960 (GDP60) - in logs - has been
obtained from the same source. Human capital data come from Barro and Lee database2.
In Table A1 in the Appendix we present the cross-correlations among di⁄erent Barro
and Lee proxies for human capital. PRI25, SEC25 and HIGH25 are respectively primary,
secondary and higher school enrolment ratios of adult population over the age of 25 and
PRIC25, SECC25 and HIGHC25 are respectively the primary, secondary and higher sec-
ondary schooling completing ratio of total population over the age of 25. Note that the
correlations between PRI25 and PRIC25, SEC25 and SECC25, and HIGH25 and HIGHC25
are fairly high, but not perfect, indicating that these measures re￿ ect di⁄erent features of
human capital. From the same table it is clear that only using school enrolment rate/literacy
rate is not su¢ cient to represent e⁄ect of human capital on growth. Lastly, the higher corre-
lation of SECC25 and HIGC25 with GDP60, than between PRIC25 and GDPI strengthens
our claim of using all levels of educational attainment for estimation purpose3.
As far as the proxies for democracy, one could use either the Gastil or the Bollen measures.
However, both indices didn￿ t have democracy data for the sample period under scrutiny. The
Polity IV data set allows us to capture the data for the needed 15 years periods and it now
contains a new variable Polity24. The Polity2 is a score given to countries based on annual
coding of the existing regimes and it follows ￿ve indicators5. Furthermore, the correlation
between Polity2 score of the countries with the Gastil Index for the years 1975 and 1990 are
￿0:866 and ￿0:825, in 1975 and 1990, respectively, that is, there is very high correlation
between the two measures of democracy.
To begin with, the following model was estimated by pooled OLS (eq. (1)):






￿j(POLITICi;n) + "i;n (1)
where, Xi;n represents a general variable as de￿ned above for country i and time t; EDU
refers to human capital proxies; POLITIC refers to democracy-related proxies; " stands for
the usual disturbance error, capturing all other omitted factors, with E("i) = 0 for all i.6.
1Averages over the three ￿fteen years periods, namely from 1960-1975, 1975-1990 and 1990-2005, were
taken to all variables and used in Section 3.
2http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html
3Even though we have high correlations between the educational variables with per capita growth rate,
they are not high enough to cause a problem of collinearity.
4The POLITY2 score is computed by subtracting the AUTOC score from the DEMOC score and the
resulting uni￿ed polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). DEMOC:
Democracy index, 0 = least democratic, 10 = most democratic. AUTOC: Autocracy index, 0 = least
autocratic, 10 = most autocratic.
5Refer to Polity IV manual for further information.
6In Section 4 - panel data estimation -, we assume that the democracy-based measures are uncorrelated
with the country-speci￿c and time-varying growth shock, ". (see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini, 2006). We
23 Empirical analysis
Table 1 presents our preliminary results and it is organized as follows: columns (1)-(4)
refer to the full sample period; columns (5)-(7) to the subperiod 1960-90, and lastly, speci-
￿cation (8) to the subperiod 1975-2005. Speci￿cation (1) is our baseline model without any
political variable included and the usual conclusions apply, i.e., conditional convergence due
to a statistically signi￿cant negative coe¢ cient on the initial GDP level, as well as a positive
e⁄ect of education variables. Columns (2)-(4) include to the baseline model di⁄erent mea-
sures (Cf. footnote 4) to account for "democracy", lacto sensu. Both POLITY2 (capturing
the initial level of democracy) and DEMOC (number of democratic features7) show a sig-
ni￿cant positive coe¢ cient at 1% level and AUTOC was estimated a statistically signi￿cant
negative coe¢ cient, meaning that more autocratic (e.g. dictatorships or totalitarism) hin-
ders growth, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, speci￿cations corresponding to columns (2)-(4)
imply a better ￿t of the model, given by higher R2. These support, inter alia, Helliwell￿ s
(1994) ￿ndings8. When we restrict our sample to a shorter time span we get similar results
for all variables. Additionally, in columns (6) and (7) we extended the concept of democracy
a bit further by including a new variable PINSTAB (measuring political instability)9. In
column (6) we substitute POLITY2 by PINSTAB and we found a negative coe¢ cient and
then a sensitivity check of the general observation that democracies experience less polit-
ical violence than non-democracies and as there is more instability the incentive to invest
reduces (so does growth) is done in column (7). Thus, if there were to be a major causal
link between democracy and political instability, then the inclusion of PINSTAB should
have made POLITY2 insigni￿cant. However, column (7) shows that is not the case, hence,
democracy in￿ uences economic performance through other channels than achieving political
stability. Our ￿ndings in speci￿cation (8) for the sub-period 1975-2005 are in accordance to
the previous discussion.
[insert Table 1]
As an additional exercise, we split our sample into rich and poor countries, based on their
1960￿ s level of per capita GDP. As before the quantitative e⁄ects initial GDP and democracy
(despite being now insigni￿cant) are consistent to our previous ￿ndings - see Table 2. The
coe¢ cient on PRIMC25 and SECC25 are much higher for the poor countries, indicating
that the growth in developing countries is much more dependent on skills obtained through
primary and secondary education (this con￿rms Barro and Sala-i-Martin￿ s (1992) claim of
diminishing returns to marginal capital in richer countries). Moreover, Tavares and Wacziarg
(2001) using a di⁄erent technique, estimate a system of simultaneous equations and ￿nd a
positive e⁄ect of democracy on growth through the channels of enhanced education, inter
alia.
thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
7Cf. supra note 4.
8There is no evidence of heteroscedasticity and each model has a statistically signi￿cant F-statistic value,
implying joint signi￿cance of the variables.
9PINSTAB is the average of the number of revolution and coups per year in the country.
3[insert Table 2]
4 Robustness Exercises
Taking into account the ongoing methodological concern that rests on the fact that
the political regime is likely not to be randomly distributed and may have an endogenous
relationship with economic development we strengthen our analysis by conducting a number
of robustness exercises. Moreover, what has been established is that is more likely to survive
at higher levels of GDP (for a more detailed discussion refer to Przeworski et al., 2000). There
is also a debate about the e⁄ect of the growth rate of GDP on the emergence and survival of
democracy (with growing evidence that democracy is more like to emerge - i.e., authoritarian
regimes collapse - under poor economic performance (see Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005, Boix
2003 and Epstein et al. 2006).
With this in mind, we ￿rst move to panel data techniques and reshape our sample in terms
of 5-year averages, which give us 9 cross-sections for each country. In Table 3 we have run
eight ￿xed e⁄ects regressions10 organized as follows: columns (1)-(2) refer to the whole sample
and regress per capita GDP growth on the initial GDP level, the three di⁄erent measures
of educational achievement, PRIC25 SECC25 AND HIGHC25, and ￿nally our proxies for
democracy, i.e., DEMOC and POLITY211. Columns (5)-(6) split the sample between rich
and poor countries by constructing four interaction terms with our democracy proxies, more
speci￿cally, we interact DEMOC and POLITY2 with a dummy variable taking the value 1 for
rich countries and 0 for poor countries. As suggested by Rodrick (1997) and Acemoglu et. al
(2008) after controlling for other variables, there is no strong relationship between democracy
and growth. With this in mind, even though it is not the purpose of this paper to delve into
the determinants of economic growth, it is worth investigating other potential channels, in
particular, capital accumulation (measured by gross ￿xed capital formation - World Bank￿ s
WDI). The idea, in this case, is that di⁄erent political regimes could implement di⁄erent
economic policies which would a⁄ect investment (one of the main determinants of economic
growth). Additionally, as a policy variable we also include openness to trade (measured as
imports plus exports over GDP - World Bank￿ s WDI)12. These two additional regressors
are included in speci￿cations (3) and (4) and (7) and (8), depending on the model under
scrutiny13.
[insert Table 3]
10Even though ￿xed e⁄ect regressions are not a panacea for omitted variable biases, they are well suited
to the investigation of the relationship between income growth and democracy.
11We drop the political instability variable, PINSTAB, for the remainder of the paper.
12See Mayda and Rodrik (2005) who documented a relationship between attitudes towards trade and a
nationalist sentiment. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the inclusion of these two additional
regressors in order to improve the subsequent inference analysis.
13Democratization is often associated with economic reforms and not controlling for these could bias
upward the estimated e⁄ect of democracy measures, via positive correlation between the latter and " in (1).
4This second approach to our data suggests (overall) a positive and statistically signi￿cant
relation between democracy variables and economic development, and this is in accordance to
the studies previously discussed. Nevertheless, in speci￿cation (1) - Table 3 - such conclusion
is not as strong, as the p-value associated with the coe¢ cient DEMOC is very close to
10%. That is, once ￿xed e⁄ects are introduced, the strong positive relationship between
income per capita and various measures of democracy, previously encountered by using
standard OLS, is weaken. It is worth pointing that in Model II the e⁄ect of democracy
lacto sensu (DEMOC and POLITY2) in rich countries is stronger vis-a-vis poorer nations
(higher magnitude and statistical signi￿cance of coe¢ cients). More importantly, when both
"GFCF" and "Openness" are included as regressors, democracy measures are no longer
signi￿cant and sometimes they become negative. Growth is positively (at a 1% level) a⁄ected
by investment, whereas with respect to trade openness, while positively related to growth,
it enters speci￿cations (3), (4), (7) and (8) with coe¢ cients which are signi￿cant, at most,
at a 80% con￿dence level (on average). Nevertheless, this result is consistent with Levine
and Renelt (1992) in which they could not reject the hypothesis that trade openness a⁄ected
growth only through its e⁄ect on rates of physical capital accumulation. Overall, the results
for these growth equations are consistent with previous empirical work, which makes us
con￿dent the model as a whole will deliver sensible results14.
Despite the results found so far, in line with the ￿rst paragraph of the present section,
in order to address the problem di⁄erently (not necessarily more successfully), we construct
new (and more meaningful) democracy measures based on the Polity2 variable and estimate
new regressions making use of the panel characteristics of the sample, again by ￿xed-e⁄ects
and, ￿nally, we also account for possible endogeneity problems by means of two-stage least
squares. While the ￿xed e⁄ects estimation is useful in removing the in￿ uence of long-run
determinants of both income per capita and democracy, it does not necessarily estimate the
causal e⁄ect of democracy on growth. Hence, the IV strategy seems an appropriate one to
carry out at this stage.
The impact of democracy on economic development is assessed by regressing three struc-
tural aspects of democracy (to be de￿ned below) on the ￿ve-year average growth rate of per
capita GDP. Endogeneity15 between right-hand side measures of democracy and autocracy
and a standard set of control variables is corrected for by estimating two-stage least squares
(TSLS) ￿xed country panel regressions where the measures of democracy and autocracy are
instrumented as suggested in Mauro (1995), La Porta et al. (1997), Hall and Jones (1999),
Acemoglu et al.(2001) and Dollar and Kraay (2003). Democracy measures are instrumented
by the durability (age in years) of the political regime type (DURABLE)16; latitude17; and
14Note, additionally, that once both "GFCF" and "Openness" are included the R squared raises, indicating
a better overall ￿t of the regression.
15And also the existence of possible measurement errors when accounting for democracy.
16Retrieved from Jaggers and Marshall￿ s (2002) database. The average age of the party system is also
used in Przeworski et al. (2000) and Beck et al. (2001). This potential instrument is also in line with
Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman￿ s (2002) paper which documents the use of the state antiquity index as
an appropriate instrument for institutional quality.
17Hall and Jones (1999) launched the general idea that societies are more likely to pursue growth-
promoting policies, the more strongly they have been exposed to Western European in￿ uence - for historical
or geographical reasons. In this context, other two possible instruments could be common and civil law,
5ethnic fragmentation ("ETHNIC")18. Other similarly possible instruments are the historical
settler mortality or population density in 1500, as in Acemoglu et al. (2003), the con-
stitutional initiative which allows citizens to amend or demand a revision of the current
constitution (as in Poterba, 1996), the share of population that speaks any major European
language - Eurfrac -, inter alia. For the three instruments chosen the exclusion restriction
is that durability, latitude and ethnic do not have any impact on present economic growth
other than their impact on democracy.
To begin with, take our measures of democracy and autocracy, DEMOC, AUTOC, and
POLITY2. None of these variables capture two important dimensions of political regimes
- either their newness (following, for example, democratization or a return to authoritarian
rule) or their more established (consolidated) nature. Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) propose
a way to do so. They de￿ne a major political regime change to have occurred when there
is a shift of at least three points in a country￿ s score on POLITY2 over three years or less.
Using this criterion, we follow Rodrik and Wacziarg￿ s (2005) technique and we de￿ne new
democracies (ND = 1) in the initial year (and subsequent four years) in which a country￿ s
POLITY2 score is positive and increases by at least three points and is sustained, ND = 0
otherwise. Established democracies (ED = 1) are those new democratic regimes that have
been sustained following the 5 years of a new democracy (ND). In any subsequent year, if
established democracies (ED) fail to sustain the status of ND, ED = 0. Using these criteria,
they de￿ne sustained democratic transitions (SDT) as the sum of ND and ED. They use the
same procedure, mutatis mutandis, to de￿ne new autocracies (NA), established autocracies
(ES) and sustained autocratic transition (SAT).
This yields six distinct binary-type measures of the character of political regimes - ND,
ED, NA, EA, SDT, and SAT - for most years during 1960-2005. Finally, Rodrik and Wacziarg
(2005) de￿ne small regime changes (SM) as changes in POLITY2 from one year to the next
that are less than three points19.
There are several advantages from de￿ning democracy and autocracy in these ways.
First, these new variables allow us to distinguish the impact of new and established electoral
democracies and autocracies on economic development, and they also allow us to assess the
impact of sustained democratic and autocratic transitions on economic growth.
Estimation results appear in the following Table 4. All regressions include a compara-
tive counterfactual for authoritarian regimes and small changes in existing regimes and the
empirics are solely focused on the impact of SDT and SAT on GDP growth.20
[insert Table 4]
translating the type of legal origin of each di⁄erent country in the sample (see La Porta et al., 1998).
18On a broad level, the role of ethnic fragmentation in explaining the (possible) growth e⁄ect of democracy
can derived from the literature of the economic consequences of ethnic con￿ ict. It has been shown that the
level of trust is low in an ethnically divided society (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000). The lack of co-operative
behavior between diverse ethnic groups leads to the tragedy of the commons as each group ￿ghts to divert
common resources to non-productive activities (e.g. Mauro, 1995).
19Thus SM = 1 for a small regime change and SM = 0 otherwise.
20For reasons of parsimony, other results are available upon request.
6Some ￿ndings shown in Table 4 stand out. To begin with, focus the attention on speci-
￿cation 1 and note that the simple sustained electoral democratic transition (SDT) and the
sustained authoritarian transition (SAT) variables do not perform particularly well, despite
having the expected (ex-ante) signs. Because some may be sceptical of these empirical re-
sults, more stringent empirical tests on the e⁄ects of democracy/ autocracy on growth were
carried out, similarly to Rock (2009). This was done by de￿ning democratic transitions as
those where the Polity2 variable is greater than 5. In these instances, a new sustainable
democratic transitions variable, SDT1 = 1 when Polity2 > 5, otherwise SDT1 = 0. Simi-
larly, a new sustainable autocratic transitions variable was created, SAT1 = 1 when Polity2
is less than 5, otherwise SAT1 = 0. The logic behind this construction is to test for the
impact of democracy and autocracy on growth in cases where countries￿governments are
closer to either pure democracies or pure autocracies.21 Speci￿cation (2) in Table 4 refer
to regressions including these new pairs of democracy and autocracy, SDT1 and SAT1. In
speci￿cation (2) the simple pure democracy (SDT1) and pure autocracy (SAT1) variables
perform somewhat better than before. The signs of the regression coe¢ cients are the same as
before, i.e., with positive (and signi￿cant) impact of SDT1 and negative (and almost signi￿-
cant at 10%) impact of SAT1. It is worth noting that SM presents mixed results throughout
the di⁄erent speci￿cations. As in Table 3, in speci￿cations (3) and (4) we add "GFCF" and
"Openness" and, despite observing an increase in the R squared, both the signs and signi￿-
cance levels of the three democracy-based measures alter (to worse). In particular, SAT and
SAT1 are not longer negative (but still insigni￿cant) and SDT1 has a smaller magnitude
and it is only marginally signi￿cant at a 10% level. With respect to the other controls, the
same conclusions as before apply. Hence, so far, this suggests that the regime type de￿ned a
pure democracy, by itself, probably has impact on economic growth. Furthermore, the R2￿ s
associated with these new speci￿cations are higher than the ones with the SDT and SAT
measures.
Finally, Table 4 columns (4) to (8) report the results for the economic growth regressions
for the same pairs but it now corrects for endogeneity by estimating through two-stage
least squares. Now that we allow for DURABLE, latitude and ETHNIC to be used as
instruments22, the economic growth advantage of democracies (both SDT and SDT1 in
speci￿cations (5) and (6) respectively) identi￿ed in the regressions shown in Table 4 columns
(1) and (2) is still marginally visible. Interestingly enough, if we move to speci￿cations (7)
and (8) not only do we lose any remaining statistical credibility of the estimated coe¢ cients
for SDT and SDT1 but their estimates change into negative numbers. This ￿nding is in
accordance with Helliwell￿ s (1994) who also tries to control for the endogeneity of democracy
and ￿nds that it spurs education and investment, but has a negative (and insigni￿cant) e⁄ect
on growth when investment (in our case, GFCF) and education (in our case, the three proxies
for human capital) are controlled for. As for pure autocracies the same conclusions as before
21The cuto⁄point for de￿ning these new and purer measures of democracy/ autocracy was taken directly
from Marshall and Jaggers (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm).
22F-statistics of the ￿rst-stage regressions exceeded the threshold value of 10 proposed by Staiger and Stock
(1997), so there is a priori no evidence that the present results su⁄er from weak instruments. Moreover,
the Sargan-Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions suggest that the instruments are valid ones (p-values
in excess of 10 in the four speci￿cations), i.e, uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded
instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation.
7apply even after including "GFCF" and "Openness", so we are inclined to conclude that
pure autocracies by themselves do not have a major e⁄ect (neither fostering or hindering)
on economic growth.
5 Conclusion and Final Remarks
This paper explores the e⁄ect of democracy and human capital on economic growth on
panel of nations over a forty ￿ve year time span, with a particular emphasis on extreme-
type political regimes. Our results con￿rm a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect of education and
democracy on growth, together with the usual convergence hypothesis. We contribute to
the understanding whether a higher index of democracy (or lower corruption) enhances eco-
nomic development. To begin with, some support is found for the hypothesis that electoral
democracy, by itself, fosters GDP growth per capita while almost no support is found for the
hypothesis that autocracy, by itself, increases it. However, once other controls are included
in the regression, in particular, investment and trade openness, than e⁄ect disappears. The
￿nding that autocracies by themselves tend not to increase economic growth is not partic-
ularly surprising - it just con￿rms what we know from the literature, not all autocracies
are committed to development (lacto sensu), have the capability to implement their devel-
opment visions, or adopt development policies that work. The ￿nding that democracies by
themselves have a mixed and/or unclear impact growth is in accordance with other empirical
work on the topic23.
In sum, more research is clearly needed in order to improve the current understanding
of the relationship (and possible bi-causality) between economic growth and democracy (or
political regime, lacto sensu). The incorporation of cultural e⁄ects of democracy (e.g. trust,
social capital), gender and/or speci￿c social groups￿characteristic (e.g. including freedom of
press or property rights) could be a meaningful extension to provide a more comprehensive
understanding of the relationship under scrutiny.
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10Table 1: Democracy Proxies, Human Capital and Economic Growth  
Whole Sample – Pooled Ordinary Least Squares 
 
Time   1960-2005  1960-90  1975-2005 
Specification  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
GDP60  -0.009***  -0.011***  -0.012***  -0.0102**  -0.0207**  -0.0165*  -0.023**  -0.0129*** 
  (-1.965)  (-0.011)  (-2.175)  (-0.01)  (-2.145)  (-1.738)  (-2.339)  (-2.737) 
PRIC25  0.009***  0.007***  0.007***  0.0074***  0.0103***  0.0108***  0.0098***  0.0049* 
  (5.0955)  (0.0072)  (3.9004)  (0.0074)  (0.0142)  (4.3833)  (3.9775)  (2.108) 
SECC25  0.011***  0.0089  0.0090**  0.0092**  0.0142*  0.0175*  0.0138*  0.0181*** 
  (2.4675)  (2.0343)  (2.035)  (2.0914)  (1.731)  (2.1729)  (1.6963)  (3.8174) 
HIGHC25  -0.0046  -0.0084  -0.0082***  -0.0081  -0.0199  -0.0232  -0.0179  -0.0025 
  (-0.639)  (-2.175)  (-1.144)  (-1.135)  (-1.093)  (-1.266)  (-0.994)  (-0.328) 
POLITY2    0.0109***      0.0107**    0.0101**  0.0042 
    (3.049)      (2.1242)    (2.0017)  (1.1319) 
DEMOC      0.0193***           
      (2.853)           
AUTOC        -0.0219***         
        (-3.049)         
PINSTAB            -0.1358  -0.1680*   
            (-1.522)  (-1.859)   
R squared  0.1398  0.1769  0.7119  0.1769  0.1736  0.1512  0.1889  0.1005 
F-test  8.641***  9.0848***  8.8098***  9.0851***  6.6650***  5.8488***  6.2432***  5.5015*** 
Note: The dependent variable is GDP growth per capita retrieved from the Penn World Tables. For the different regressors definitions and 
main sources refer to the main text. All specifications include the estimate of a constant term, not reported for reasons of parsimony. Robust 
t-statistics using heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote significant coefficients at 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively. 
 
Table 2: Democracy Proxies, Human Capital and Economic Growth  
Split Sample – Pooled Ordinary Least Squares 
 
  Rich  Poor 
Specification  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
GDP60  -0.0089***  -0.0103**  -0.6480***  -0.6366*** 
  (-2.7384)  (-0.0103)  (-4.2588)  (-4.1739) 
PRIC25  0.0052***  0.0047**  0.0141**  0.0142** 
  (2.6409)  (2.0974)  (2.3681)  (2.3754) 
SECC25  0.0082**  0.0074  0.0382***  0.0335** 
  (2.3017)  (2.3682)  (2.9917)  (2.4689) 
HIGHC25  -0.0112*  -0.0126  0.0034  0.0014 
  (-1.7143)  (-1.5747)  (0.2041)  (0.0863) 
POLITY2    0.0058    0.0052 
    (1.2918)    (1.0136) 
R squared  0.0701  0.0747  0.2981  0.2984 
F-test  3.5228***  3.1665***  7.2651***  6.02*** 
Note: The dependent variable is GDP growth per capita retrieved from the Penn World Tables. For the different regressors definitions and 
main sources refer to the main text. All specifications include the estimate of a constant term, not reported for reasons of parsimony. Robust 




 Table 3: Democracy Proxies and Economic Growth 
Whole Sample with interaction terms – Fixed Effects 
 
Model  I  II 
Specification  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
































































DEMOC  0.0269* 
(1.96) 
  0.0062 
(0.543) 
         
POLITY2    0.0522* 
(1.83) 
  -0.0003 
(-0.255) 
       



















        0.052* 
(1.64) 
  0.0023 
(0.963) 
 
DEMOC*poor          0.018 
(0.80) 





          0.042** 
(2.25) 
  -0.0102 
(-1.036) 
POLITY2*poor            0.021 
(1.19) 
  -0.0005 
(-0.578) 
                 
R squared  0.3561  0.3297  0.5814  0.5236  0.462  0.4003  0.7422  0.7033 
Note: The dependent variable is GDP growth per capita retrieved from the Penn World Tables. For the different regressors definitions and 
main sources refer to the main text. All specifications include the estimate of a constant term, not reported for reasons of parsimony. Year 
dummies were included in all regressions. Robust t-statistics using heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, 
and * denote significant coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Table 4: Polity2-based measures a la Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) and Economic Growth 
Whole Sample – Fixed Effects and Two-Stage Least Squares 
 
Model  I  II 
Specification  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Fixed Effects  Two-Stage-Least Squares 
















































































                 
SDT  0.584 
(1.01) 
  0.210 
(0.812) 
  0.1124* 
(1.661) 
  -0.0997 
(-1.22) 
 
SAT  -0.0844 
(-1.17) 
  0.0087 
(1.20) 
  0.0084 
(0.751) 
  0.0025 
(0.991) 
 
SM  -0.0071 
(-0.41) 
  -0.0177 
(-1.09) 
  -0.0114 
(-0.106) 
  0.0002 
(0.014) 
 
                 
SDT1    0.3601** 
(1.98) 
  0.131* 
(1.572) 
  0.3577* 
(1.71) 
  -0.112 
(-0.336) 
SAT1    -0.1844 
(-1.31) 
  0.0011 
(0.953) 
  -0.023 
(-0.541) 
  0.098 
(0.887) 
SM    0.0028 
(0.42) 
  -0.113 
(-1.22) 
  0.0087 
(0.720) 
  -0.099 
(-1.074) 
                 
R squared  0.2035  0.2879  0.3612  0.4112  0.0774  0.109  0.154  0.182 
within  0.154  0.1229  0.051  0.223         
between  0.2702  0.3560  0.555  0.5804         
Hansen Test 
(p-value) 
        0.171  0.227  0.211  0.329 
 Note: The dependent variable is GDP growth per capita retrieved from the Penn World Tables. For the different regressors definitions and 
main sources refer to the main text. All specifications include the estimate of a constant term, not reported for reasons of parsimony. Year 
dummies were included in specifications (1) and (2). In Model II we use as instruments: durable, latitude and ethnic. Robust t-statistics 
using heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. The Hansen’s test p-value for over-identifying restrictions is presented 






Table A1: Correlation Matrix – Human Capital proxies and GDP 
 
  PRI25  PRIC25  SEC25  SECC25  HIGH25  HIGHC25 
PRI25             
PRIC25  0.818           
SEC25  0.154  0.287         
SECC25  0.119  0.268  0.92       
HIGH25  0.098  0.207  0.649  0.679     
HIGHC25  0.129  0.235  0.656  0.684  0.944   
GDP60  0.229  0.426  0.664  0.671  0.657  0.598 
 
 